Introduction and general perspectives on the study
However much the present author welcomes the idea of quantitative Lisbon process comparisons, several very severe methodological deficiencies seem to characterize the recently published CER study.
• Only 2 of the Eurostat structural Lisbon indicators 2 present a complete data series for the period 2004 and 2005, thus any comparisons referring to this period are at least a misnomer. We therefore decided to call the time periods in our re-run "the most recent period (tn) and the preceding period (tn-1)", with the most recent period sometimes referring to 2005, but sometimes to 2004, or even 2003.
• One of the 14 Lisbon structural indicators, the dispersion of regional employment rates, does not list any data at all for the EU-member countries Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, and Slovenia over the entire period, and
• What's more, one of the indicators -comparative price levels -correlates very positively with the other main Lisbon targets, and yet the Commission, Eurostat and the member countries continue to sanction it as an indicator that should achieve a low level to be compatible with the Lisbon process. High price levels and a stable currency and highly priced tradables and non-tradables are significantly and very closely associated (absolute value of the correlation coefficient higher or equal to +-0.50) with a low energy intensity of the economy, a low long-term unemployment rate, a high rate of employment of older workers, a high rate of gross domestic expenditures on research and development, a high rate of total employment, a high GDP per capita and a high labor productivity. A rigorous scientific interpretation of these facts would warrant at least the calculation of two listings of ranks, one considering a high price level as something inherently wrong for the Lisbon process, the other considering a high price level as something structurally inherent in a highly developed economy with highly priced tradable goods and non-tradable goods, and with poorer countries catching up (Balassa/Samuelson's effect).
• Far from presenting state of the art methodology, the CER study simply performs an additive scoreboard calculation of ranks, neglecting other techniques such as the calculation of composite indices that became very popular in the applied social sciences especially with the publication of the UNDP Human Development Reports, let alone principal components or other multivariate techniques, available via the major computer softwares for the social sciences, like the SPSS or the SAS programs. Scoreboard ranks are absolutely inferior to such more novel techniques
In the light of these methodological remarks, we present the following final table of the results of our calculations, based on the UNDP type of methodology. Our Lisbon Index projects the results of 13 component variables onto 13 dimension indicators that each range from 0 to 1, with 1 representing the best value and 0 the worst. The 13 dimension indices are then multiplied by 1/13 and added together for the composite index, ranging from 0 (worst value) to 1 (best value). Norway, Sweden and Denmark are the Lisbon model countries of the most recent period, while Romania, Bulgaria and Poland are indeed the "villains (ECVs)" for tn. But are poorer member countries of the Union to be castigated just for their poverty, or rather for their bad performance in recent periods?
Looking at the rates of changes in the index, there is some hope for Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia, while Estonia, Hungary and Portugal are the laggards. Slovenia  11  3  Ireland  9  4  Cyprus  15  5  Denmark  3  6  Bulgaria  26  7  United Kingdom  7  8  Finland  4  9  Spain  19  10  Greece  21  11  Italy  18  12  Belgium  12  13  Sweden  2  14  Norway  1  15  France  10  16  Czech Republic  14  17  Slovakia  24  18  Poland  27  19  Netherlands  6  20  Luxembourg  5  21  Austria  8  22  Romania  25  23  Germany  13 The real heroes -past good cumulated performance, good prospect of things even still getting better in future:
Summary
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We also come to the conclusion that the CER study, compared to our own final results for tn above, systematically overstates the performance of Austria, Portugal, Estonia, and Greece, while Finland, Latvia, Spain, Luxembourg, and Italy, are performing much better than expected. • At-risk-of-poverty rate after social transfers -total. A statistically decent solution would have been to work with the following data matrix, based on 13 indicators, not 14, and to use the imputed statistics 5 , where there are missing values for the most recent two years. Our final data matrix, on which we based our own comparisons, and which is available from our materials at our website reference to this publication, is the following: Under these specifications, the EXCEL program yields the following results, all documented in our internationally freely available Internet background materials to this article: Although the ranking results of the CER Institute and our own ranking results -without the necessary corrections for the price level variable -closely correlate with each other, the CER study obviously and grossly seems to overestimate the performance of Denmark, Greece, Portugal and Ireland, while it underreports the performance of Italy, Lithuania, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic. On a general level, and compared to the composite indicators, presented below, we however come to the conclusion that the CER study systematically overstates the performance of Austria, Portugal, Estonia, and Greece, while Finland, Latvia, Spain, Luxembourg, and Italy are performing much better than expected.
Towards a UNDP type indicator of the Lisbon process
Our combined measure of the velocity of the Lisbon transformation process, presented here for the first time in the literature, will be of a UNDP-Indicator type, combining the thirteen different dimensions on a uniform scale, ranging from 0 (lowest value) to 1 (highest value). It is based on We were calculating each dimension index by the formula:
Actual value -minimum value (1) dimension index = -----------------------------------------------Maximum value -minimum value
We were then multiplying the thirteen dimension/component indices by 1/13 and simply added the 13 components [multiplied by 1/13] together The results are: The deficient analysis of the links between globalization and socio-economic performance, inherent in the study
For the aims of this study, we also compared the pro-globalist policy conclusions that were presented by the CER Institute without any further politometric evidence presented by them with the results of our own recently concluded analyses of the determinants of the processes of development on a global scale 7 . In order to be able to properly interpret the different results, we already took care of the many different implicit directions of the indicators etc. Significant tvalues from our multiple regressions, supporting the pro-globalist policies of the Commission, are printed in blue bold letters, while results, clearly supporting the anti-globalization movements, are printed in red, bold, and indented letters.
Considering other important intervening factors, like development levels and human capital formation, the ultraliberal thinking inherent in the Bolkestein directive that should lead to a considerable lowering of price levels in the formerly "non-tradable" sectors of services in Europe would be certainly compatible with some aspects of growth and better employment (and thus also gender relations), but our three main other indicators of globalization, i.e. high foreign saving, "economic freedom" and high MNC penetration ratios, are still very systemati-7 At the mentioned website http://www.gallileus.info/gallileus/members/m_TAUSCH/publications/114344941248/114344964315/ we also make available our recent research paper entitled: "The Lisbon process, re-visited. A reality check of the European social model". Paper, prepared for the International Conference "Economic Relations in the Enlarged EU". University of Wroclaw, Poland. May 11, 2006 -May 12, 2006 . This paper further develops themes already presented in the publications and (Tausch 2006, forthcoming) and concentrates rather on the more long-term, structural and UNDP-indicator oriented long-term analysis of the European development crisis. It also presents a politometric analysis of the development success or failure of the more than 300 European regions over the last decade. It also tries to systematically evaluate the relevance of the Balassa/Samuelson type of analysis for the debate on the "services directive" (Bolkestein directive) for the Lisbon process. Analyzing world social, gender, ecological and economic development on the basis of the main 9 predictors, compatible with the majority of the more than 240 published studies on the cross-national determinants of the "human condition" around the globe, we first present results of 32 equations about development performance in 131 countries with available data. We come to the conclusion that while there is some confirmation for the "blue", market paradigm as the best and most viable way of world systems governance concerning economic growth, re-distribution and gender issues, the "red-green" counter-position is confirmed concerning such vital and basic indicators as life expectancy and the human development index. We also show that Europe's crisis is not caused by what the neo-liberals term a "lack of world economic openness" but rather, on the contrary, by the enormous amount of passive globalization that Europe -together with Latin America -experienced over recent years. Our combined measure of the velocity of the globalization process is based on the increases of capital penetration over time, on the increases of economic openness over time, and on the decreases of the comparative price level over time: the United States, Mexico, larger parts of Africa and large sections of West and South Asia escaped from the combined pressures of globalization, while Eastern and Southern Latin America, very large parts of Europe, Russia and China were characterized by a specially high tempo of globalization. The "wider Europe" of the EU-25 is not too distantly away from the social realities of the more advanced Latin American countries. From the viewpoint of world systems theory such tendencies are not a coincidental movement along the historic ups and downs of social indicators, but the very symptom of a much more deep-rooted crisis, which is the beginning of the real re-marginalization and re-peripherization of the European continent. We finally also show the relevance of these assumptions for the analysis of European regional inequality. Established economics teaches us that for economic gaps to be bridged, a process of convergence sets in that was described by Bela Balassa and Paul Samuelson, independently from each other, more than 4 decades ago, and which is called ever since the "Balassa-Samuelson effect". But a reversal of what was once known as the Balassa/Samuelson effect has set in, with falling prices of nontradables in the highly developed European center countries. Our macro-quantitative calculations show that considering other important intervening factors, like development levels and human capital formation, the ultraliberal thinking inherent in the recent "Bolkestein directive" that should lead to a considerable lowering of price levels in the formerly "non-tradable" sectors of services in Europe would be certainly compatible with some aspects of growth and better employment (and thus also gender relations), but our three main other indicators of globalization, i.e. high foreign saving, "economic freedom" and high MNC penetration ratios, are still very systematically linked with severe deficits in the social sphere, whatever the research design chosen. And in addition, powerful forces of agglomeration propel Europe in the direction of further regional income concentration and inequality, thus blocking the hopes of the poorer segments of the East European new member countries. A process of catching up development seems under these conditions a very remote hope indeed.
cally linked with severe deficits in the social sphere, whatever the research design chosen. And in addition, powerful forces of agglomeration propel Europe in the direction of further regional income concentration and inequality, thus blocking the hopes of the poorer segments of the East European new member countries. A process of catching up development ("Balassa/Samuelson") seems under these conditions a remote hope: We thus believe that the present study, with all its deficiencies, is perhaps an impetus for the further Lisbon debate in Europe, but the statistical and theoretical details need a much more careful consideration in the future.
